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ABSTRACT
We examine the gap between theory and practice in social accountability 
mechanisms to improve local governance performance in Tanzania. We do so 
through drawing on an ethnographic investigation tracing lines of blame and 
responsibility for service delivery, from individual citizens up to the central state 
incorporating a total of 340 interviews and 12 focussed group discussions. We 
have two keys findings: Firstly, that there is a wide divergence between formal 
lines of accountability and where actors direct blame for performance failure in 
practice. Secondly, building a collective understanding of this divergence pro-
vides an effective starting point for intervention to improve performance. Our 
conclusion is that dominant assumptions on social accountability interventions 
require significant revision in light of our findings.
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Introduction
Shabani is a government water officer in a Tanzanian District office and has 
been employed for 15 years. He knows there are national water policies, and 
they sound good on paper, but there appears to be little activity happening 
at the District level. Sometimes, when a donor is interested, there is a flurry of 
activity. In some villages too, there are NGOs who seem to be doing some-
thing when they have money, but he is not sure what. He has been to 
countless public meetings in villages where they tell him that they need an 
improved water supply, but every village says this and what is he supposed to 
do? Last year was an election year and his department only received 10% of 
their allocated budget. There was no money to do anything, sometimes 
salaries were delayed. He wants to do his job and improve services. His family 
live in a water-scarce village but he is stuck in the system.
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Where should the blame lie for this inertia and who is responsible for 
taking action? Is it the fault of the central government for not giving him the 
resources he needs to do his job? Is it the fault of the District councillors for 
not prioritising spending on water projects, and for not organising the 
villagers to make contributions? Perhaps there is the money going missing 
through corruption. Perhaps he should blame the villagers as they seem to 
expect that the government will just come and do everything for them. 
Perhaps he should blame himself for not being proactive enough.
Many donor-funded social accountability projects and programmes start 
from the assumption that citizen action is required to hold the state to 
account and drive the effective delivery of public services (Fox 2015; Joshi 
2014; Mdee and Thorley 2016a, 2016b). With this assumption, a lack of 
progress on service delivery might be framed as being caused by corruption 
within the system, a lack of proper institutional mechanisms and policies, or 
inertia and apathy on the part of office holders. The social accountability 
answer is to create mechanisms to ‘shout at the system’ underpinned by the 
assertion that citizens hold rights to services and they can and should orga-
nise to use their collective voice to demand action for improvement. 
Collective citizen voice is then transmitted to the system through a civil 
society organisation that can lobby office holders to demand action. 
Literature on public participation, citizen action and social accountability 
have long made clear that such assumptions are overly simplistic (Carothers 
and De Gramont 2013; Fox 2007, 2015, 2016; Joshi 2014, 2017; Mansuri and 
Rao 2013); nevertheless, they frequently appear in the everyday discourse of 
NGOs, and their projects1 (Tembo and Chapman 2014, 2017).
For such social accountability mechanisms to function then lines of 
responsibility, and therefore, blame for failure would need to be clear. In 
theory, responsibilities are set out in national policies, but there is often a gap 
in the extent to which such policies are/can be implemented (Wild et al. 2015; 
Andrews 2015; Mdee and Thorley 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). It therefore cannot 
be assumed that responsibility for the delivery of public services is commonly 
understood and agreed by all actors.
This article argues that narratives of responsibility and blame-avoidance 
matter for social accountability to function and that interventions to improve 
local governance and service delivery must be built on actual rather than 
idealised conditions and relationships. It is necessary to understand the gap 
between policy on paper (e.g. on how planning processes work) and how they 
operate in practice in order to facilitate effective processes of improvement.
There are three parts to the paper: Firstly, we show why mapping narra-
tives of blame and responsibility are a critical starting point for working out 
how to improve local governance and service delivery. Secondly, we apply 
Hood’s concept of ‘blameworld’ (Hood 2010) to map lines of responsibility 
and blame in two Districts in Tanzania, drawing on an extensive ethnographic 
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dataset. Finally, we argue that this research shows that more effective social 
accountability programmes should be based on a detailed understanding of 
how local governance actually works, rather than on idealised constructs of 
‘citizens’ holding ‘government’ to account.
Untangling blame and responsibility in social accountability
Social accountability mechanisms often start with the principle of informed 
rights holders seeking enactment of responsibilities as set down in policy or 
legislation. Such an approach assumes clearly identifiable duty bearers and 
rights holders, and specifically that when public services or rights are not 
realised that blame and responsibility are obvious, and action can be 
demanded. This assumption fundamentally requires that blame and respon-
sibility can be ascribed to actors that can be compelled, through citizen 
demand, to change their behaviour. However, responsibilities are often rela-
tively undefined and diffuse. Such foundational assumptions of social 
accountability are increasingly contested but remain common in interna-
tional development practice (Fox 2007, 2015, 2016, 2018; Hickey and King 
2016; Joshi 2014, 2017; Tembo and Chapman 2017).
These critiques of the practice argue that much (but certainly not all) social 
accountability work remains rooted in isolated ‘tactics’ such as tool led 
interventions (e.g. scorecards), information provision, and localised citizen 
voice activities; as opposed to a more strategic approach involving multiple 
and co-ordinated tactics, enabling environments for collective action to 
reduce risk, citizen voice co-ordinated with governmental reforms, multi- 
level, iterative and contested campaigns not limited interventions (Fox 
2015; Tembo and Chapman 2017).
We suggest that a more strategic approach to social accountability might 
start with understanding lines of blame and responsibility in local governance 
and public service delivery. This is more than creating and ascribing blame to 
particular actors and institutions, but is about identifying multiple, conflicting 
and shifting lines of responsibility for action and where blame falls for failure. 
This tell us much about the perceptions, narratives and positions of the actors 
within local governance and public service delivery systems. A formal policy 
may set out clear lines of accountability and how they should operate in 
theory, but narratives of responsibility and blame describe how governance 
works in practice, and yet have been significantly under-theorised or exam-
ined (Olivier de Sardan 2011)
Hood suggests: ‘. . . blame-avoidance is a descriptive account of a force that 
is often said to underlie much of political and institutional behaviour in 
practice’ (Hood 2007, 192).
There is little literature examining blame in relation to international devel-
opment and institutional reform in Southern countries. It has received some 
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examination in relation to direct and diffuse responsibility for the achieve-
ment of internationally negotiated benchmarking mechanisms such as the 
MDGs (Clegg 2015) but there are very few examinations of blame and 
responsibility within across decentralised systems. A notable exception here 
being a study on environmental governance in China (Ran 2017).
Bringing in blameworld
Blame can be used to make claims on actors and institutions but blame 
avoidance can be also used to sidestep and obfuscate responsibility. 
Understanding blame avoidance and blame shifting help us to identify lines 
of power and barriers to change.
Hood (2010) argues that within governance systems there are a number of 
worlds, and within these worlds, individuals and systems who each can play 
strategies of shifting blame upwards, sideways, downwards and outwards. In 
his work on blame avoidance in Northern Governments, he identifies signifi-
cant players as the top bananas, street-level bureaucrats, the middle man-
agers, and civil society as set out in Table 1. Players can (depending on their 
position) shift blame upwards, downwards, sideways or outwards, with stra-
tegies of blame avoidance rooted in three main types of blame-avoidance 
resources:
(1) Presentational – shaping the narrative, e.g. through media engagement
(2) Agency – distribution of formal responsibility to multiple actors, so as 
to diffuse responsibility
(3) Policy – selection of policy or operational procedures to reduce risk of 
blame, or to shift blame
Strategies of blame avoidance that can be deployed vary according to context 
and rituals of power in particular instances (Resodihardjo et al. 2016). Cultures 
of blame avoidance can also shift over time, for instance, Baekkeskov and Rubin 
(2017) describe how China has shifted from an environment of secrecy to one 
of employing ‘lightening rods’ to absorb and shift blame. Rwanda’s preference 
for centralised control and the use of performance (imihigo) contracts for public 
servants have created an environment where lines of blame are carefully 
defined by the state (Gaynor 2014; Purdeková 2011)
Blame and blame avoidance also relate to cultural specificities of shame. 
Formal systems of accountability that expect public officials to be held respon-
sible for poor service delivery might seek to shame officials or institutions into 
performing to a certain expected standard, for example, through a public 
expenditure tracking exercise. Both blame and shame speak to ideas of 
moral and just behaviour on the part of the individual. It could be that 
where there is a high degree of dissonance between how systems are 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES 5
supposed to work in theory, and how they work in practice; that this is also 
associated with dissonance in how an individual office-holder is expected to 
behave. For example, the payment, by a service user, of an unofficial fee (a 
bribe) to a public official in order to jump a queue is normatively how a system 
might operate in practice, and is widely seen by service users as legitimate, 
after all that official has to supplement their low salary and their wider family 
network will benefit from that. Ekeh’s conceptualisation of the two publics in 
Africa is pertinent here, and reminds us that blame and shame are contested 
and shifting; and maybe constituted differently depending on the perceptions 
of the observer (Ekeh 1975; Goddard et al. 2016; Osaghae 2006).
Method
Mapping dynamics of blame and responsibility is necessarily a complex multi- 
level process requiring engagement with citizens, non-state actors and gov-
ernment actors across all levels. This draws on phase 1 of a 3-year action 
research project2 that sought to create a local governance performance index 
(LGPI) in Tanzania through a co-design process with local government and 
civil society stakeholders. An index and set of baseline data were created in 
two Districts (Mvomero and Kigoma-Ujiji) from 2014 to 2017 (Mdee, 
Tshomba, and Mushi 2017)). The two Districts were selected by the research 
team3 in order to test the co-design approach in one rural (dominant political 
party) area and one urban (opposition party) area.
Phase 1 of the project began with an aim to map the gap between how 
local governance and service delivery were stated to operate in theory (in 
policy documents), and how it operated in practice. The research team 
included experts from across the social sciences (sociology, anthropology 
and economics) and this informed the choice of a two-stage methodological 
approach. A qualitative ethnographic exploration of accountability for local 
service delivery was selected in order to reveal multiple narratives and posi-
tions across different actors and the level of government (Lee 1999). Phase 2 
followed later followed a process of coding and refining this data to produce 
a quantitative local governance performance index. However this paper 
focusses only on phase 1. Open-ended discursive interviews were framed 
around the question of ‘who is responsible for local service delivery?’, ‘who is 
responsible for improving services?’ and who is to blame for a lack of 
improvement/problems’? Interviewees were also asked to reflect on their 
own roles or participation in local governance mechanisms. Interviewees 
were all conducted in Swahili by members of the research team employed 
by Mzumbe University. Interviews were sequenced to gradually build emer-
gent narratives from the lowest unit of government (the village). Villages/ 
streets were purposively selected to cover different profiles of livelihoods in 
the District. Twenty-five citizens, purposively selected for gender and age 
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were interviewed in each location (giving a total of 200 citizens), along with 
all village/street elected representatives and village/street local government 
employees. Key informant interviews with other selected actors such as the 
staff of civil society organisations and religious leaders were also included. 
This process then tracked upwards to include ward and district level staff and 
political representatives, and civil society representatives, and finally within 
the Ministries of the central government and head offices of significant civil 
society groups. A total of 340 interviews was conducted in 2015.
The qualitative data were analysed thematically by the core research 
team during a two-day analytical workshop in Kigoma in December 2015, 
firstly in relation to responsibility for improving governance and service 
delivery; and secondly, in relation to specific attributes of different service 
areas of local government (the necessity of this differentiation is shown in 
Batley and Mcloughlin 2015). Findings were also triangulated through 
reference to existing research on local governance in Tanzania. Additional 
validation activities were undertaken in both districts during phase 2 of the 
project after the local governance index was fully designed and tested 
(Mdee, Tshomba, and Mushi 2017). The results discussed below relate to 
the analysis undertaken in phase 1. Thematic coding was applied across the 
stratified interview data set. All members of the core research team read full 
interview transcripts and highlighted answers to the questions outlined 
above. This was done in the same order as the interviewees were conducted 
and therefore gradually constructed a complex mapping of narratives of 
responsibility and blame. The analysis done by the core research team was 
further refined through a validation and triangulation process at the district 
level by stakeholders from all levels of government, as well as citizens and 
representatives of civil society through 12 focussed group discussions dur-
ing early 2016.
Results and discussion
In our interviews, all appointed and salaried civil servants in the Tanzanian 
government system articulate the local development planning process as it is 
set out in the policy. Since 1999 the Tanzanian Government actively pursued 
an incremental strategy of what is referred to as, ‘Decentralization by 
Devolution’ (DbyD). This relates to the transfer of power and authority from 
central government to subnational tiers of government and based on the 
principle of subsidiarity. ‘Local governments through their elected leaders have 
a responsibility for social development and public service provision within their 
areas of jurisdiction; facilitation of maintenance of law and order and promotion 
of local development through participatory processes’ (Muro and Namusonge 
2015, 106). Participation is expected to ‘empower’ citizens and supports 
Nyerere’s concept of self-reliance, that participation by citizens is an 
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obligation to build the nation (Muro and Namusonge 2015). Therefore, 
participation by citizens is not only in giving their opinions in village/street- 
led planning processes, but in the expectation of contributing their labour 
and finance for community development initiatives, such as school classroom 
building (Tidemand et al. 2008). Civil society organisations are viewed as an 
integral to this process, as a conduit for citizen's voice, holding government 
to account and through enabling participation in projects aimed at ‘devel-
opment’ (Mercer 2003; Green 2014). Figure 1 shows the maps of this system: 
showing how development planning decisions are designed to flow from the 
village/street level to be aggregated into District plans and are then commu-
nicated to Central government ministries for resourcing. The figure also 
captures how elected representatives at village, ward and national levels 
relate to the different levels of government executive.
Decentralisation in practice – responsibility and blame
In practice, the data show that decentralisation is incomplete, contested 
and ineffective. This is not a new finding but reconfirms previous studies, 
e.g. Lange (2008). Figure 1 sets out the ‘d by d’ system and shows 
a central column with planning being driven from the village/street 
level through the citizens (wananchi) and their elected representatives, 
and resources flow back down according to the plans. In practice, the flow 
of resources seldom matches the agreed plans. Regional and district 
commissioners also exert considerable power over the process of resource 
allocations and report directly to the president. This is an additional and 
parallel power structure that remains embedded in the politics of the 
ruling party, CCM.
According to respondents at these levels, initiatives aimed at strengthen-
ing local government or tackling accountability from the local to a national 
level often focus on the district. Yet, the district sits above many layers of local 
government (Division-Ward-Village, and in some areas the sub-village desig-
nation of Hamlet and 10 cells (10 households)) before the individual citizen. 
These levels of government are often physically far removed from district 
administrations. There is also a blurring of lines of responsibility in some 
sectors in relation to the central and local government powers, particularly in 
health and education.
Despite rhetoric of decentralisation the central government still exerts 
significant control over local service delivery through the allocation of 
resources and policy (Chaligha, Henjewele, and Kessy 2007; Chaligha 2014). 
Tidemand et al. (2015) note there are clear inequalities in the distribution of 
funds from central government and patterns of favouring districts with 
prominent MPs is evident.
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Figure 1 shows that considerable responsibility for governance and service 
delivery is placed on the village level and on citizens themselves through 
their volunteer labour or financial contributions (Boesten, Mdee, and Cleaver 
2011; Green 2014). The decentralisation of service delivery can also lead to 
Figure 1. Governance and planning flows in Tanzania.
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elite capture at the local level and even to increased inequality in access for 
the poorest (see, e.g. Cleaver and Toner 2006 on the water sector). The ward, 
village and street levels of government responsibilities include peace and 
security, land allocations, social welfare and social service delivery, water, 
economic development, HIV/AIDS, environment etc. Yet the capacity of 
government at this level is very limited. There is one paid office at the 
village/street level (the Village/Street Executive Officer), which works in con-
junction with unpaid citizen councillors.
Our data set illustrates that the majority (84%) of citizens are uncertain 
over responsibility and accountability for effective governance and service 
delivery. Governance and service delivery are consistently referred to as 
maendeleo (development) in interviews.
Development requires taking out some levels in the leadership hierarchy. The 
hierarchy is composed of the Member (Mjumbe), the Street Chairperson 
(Mwenyekiti wa mtaa), the Village or Street Executive Officer (Mtendaji wa 
mtaa/kijiji), the Ward Executive Officer (mtendaji wa kata) and then the Ward 
Councillor. This long chain of hierarchy levels generates an environment 
subject to corruption rather than generating performance because all these 
people in the leadership chain are actually playing the same role. Interview, 
male, Kigoma
As a result, citizens had little awareness of what they should expect of local 
government at any level, as this quotation asserts:
To my knowledge, the role of a councillor is to lead people in all development 
issues such as road and hospital construction, water supply and so on. I don’t 
know if this lady (elected councillor) was fulfilling her role as she was supposed 
to, because in X there is no clean water, nor electricity, nor good road. I don’t 
know anything about the MP of my area because I’ve never saw him anywhere 
and I don’t know what the responsibility of an MP is Interview, male, Mvomero
As with responsibility for the development, we found many different views on 
who should be responsible for holding local government to account. Around 
25% of the participants in the research believed that citizens are responsible 
for holding elected leaders to account; however, the data suggest a wide 
diversity of opinions on where responsibility should lie including as illustrated 
by the following quotations:
The one who is responsible for holding local government to account is the 
citizen, because the citizen is the one who discovers the weakness of his/her 
leaders. After discovering or seeing a weakness, a citizen has the right to 
present it for action in the village meeting . . . Citizens should report their 
councillors and MPs to the village office, ward office or district council offices. 
Citizens have full mandate to hold their leaders to account. Participant, focus 
group with village leaders, Mvomero
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The one who is responsible for holding MPs and councillors to account is the 
chairperson of the CCM (ruling party) because these leaders are under that 
political party. Participant, focus group, Mvomero
The district commissioner (DC). Why the DC? Because he is a leader of all local 
government leaders such as councillors, ward executive officers (WEOs), Mtaa 
executive officers (MEOs),4 street chairpersons and street members of commit-
tees. Participant, focus group, Kigoma
There was recognition of the inter-dependency between different levels and 
functions when it comes to the ability to perform:
It is difficult for the councillor and MP to do good work or perform their duties 
and responsibilities well if the lower level (from Kitongoji level to village level) 
does not perform well. Participant, focus group with village leaders, Mvomero
We need to hold lower-level leaders like the village chairperson to account 
before holding councillors or MPs to account. Participant, focus group with 
females, Mvomero
Civil servants also frequently expressed their frustration in interviews:
There are too many bosses who are supervising us . . . civil servants’ account-
ability is affected by availability of many supervisors who in one way or another 
have different opinions and decisions regarding resources. These bosses 
include ministers, permanent secretaries, regional commissioner, regional 
administrative secretary, district commissioner, district administrative secretary, 
members of parliament, councillors and the secretary of the leading party 
(CCM). Participant, Focus group with local officials, Kigoma
Elected representatives, in theory, could be held to account through the 
election process. However, the research also revealed concerns amongst 
citizens about taking action against elected representatives. Fear of reprisal, 
security, education, personal relationships, and power dynamics were cited as 
obstacles to such action:
The system means is not easy to remove them once they are elected. The 
community keeps silence when the leaders do not do what they are supposed 
to do. Participant, focus group with CSOs, Mvomero
We are the ones who elect them but we don’t know how to hold them to 
account, we don’t know the procedure that we can use to hold them to 
account. Participant, focus group, Mvomero
Mechanisms for accountability exist in policy, with officials in focus group 
discussions outlining clear procedures that exist in law, but in practice, most 
respondents are not using them or they do not function:
Village leadership is answerable to the Village Assembly. Things are not moving 
because there is no accountability. The Village Assembly is not the platform to 
hold leaders to account and accountable, instead village’s leadership use them 
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to give directives. There is no room for engaging in dialogue and discussion. 
Many leaders and civil servants are not delivering, and instead of citizens using 
the system and available room to demand for accountability they keep com-
plaining and whining. Interview, Senior official, Unit in the Ministry of 
President’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PORLAG)
Our village chairperson used to call meetings, but he does not appear in those 
meetings, how can we hold him to account, while he is not attending village 
meetings? Participant, focus with village leaders, Mvomero
In reviewing the multiple narratives in the dataset, it was evident that blame 
shifting of responsibility for problems was occurring between levels of 
government, and between government and other stakeholders. This analy-
sis was tested and verified by stakeholder reference groups in each of the 
Districts.
District government – shifting blame up, down and out
This is the level of government on which most responsibility for service 
delivery is channelled. At this level, lack of progress and problems of service 
implementation, blame flows both up and down. The central state has in 
effect enacted a partial decentralisation: whilst many service delivery respon-
sibilities are devolved to the Districts, the resources flows do not match 
requirements, or even planned allocations. Reliability, availability and time-
liness of funds came up again and again with district officials:
The disbursed funds from the government are not enough and neither the 
revenue collected from own sources within the council. Government funding is 
never enough and even when it is disbursed it is not on time to carry out 
activities as planned. The Government prioritizes several big spending projects, 
all to be done at the same time or within a short period of time. Also, most of 
them are politically motivated and sometimes not in the plan for the annual 
spending. Interview, local government official, Kigoma
Local ward councillors are also blamed for their failure to mobilise the people:
The elected are not doing what they are supposed to do and sensitise the 
citizens to contribute properly to “development” Focus group, Mvomero.
NGOs were blamed for not working with the efforts of the District and so 
contributing to fragmentation and duplication of efforts. Blame was therefore 
is enacted outwards, with operational and organisational mechanisms put in 
place to check the activities of NGOs.
Local leaders- citizens or government?
At the village/street level service delivery and citizen representation func-
tions appear blurred. Most officials and representatives are unpaid yet fulfil 
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many formal functions across health, education, social services, justice and 
security, environment and livelihoods, but with very limited resources. So, 
should they be viewed as part of the government or as citizens? To all 
intents and purposes, Tanzania still operates as a one-party state and there-
fore citizen leaders are expected to deliver the agenda of the central 
government.
Elected councillors felt unfairly blamed by citizens. They are aware that if 
their respective constituencies see no progress, they could be blamed for 
that. However, they expressed that they struggled to be effective because 
they do not get paid (blame shifted upwards):
The council chairperson comes into the office twice a month and this is because 
they are not paid, but the Village Executive Officer and Ward Executive Officer 
come in every day . . . The councillors are supposed to be the supervisors of the 
VEO and WEO but we don’t get our 350,000 TZs salary in time. It can take up to 
a year to get our money so it gets to the point that we come into the office but 
we are not happy and we cannot work effectively. Participant, focus group with 
councillors, Mvomero
Further, councillors reported poor communication and awareness amongst 
stakeholders. Both district officials and councillors blamed NGOs for lack of 
cooperation (blame shifted outwards). It was reported in focus groups that 
NGOs sometimes bypass the village leadership when they bring citizen 
complaints to the district level.
Wanachi (Citizens)- rights bearers or the problem?
Decentralisation by Devolution (DbyD) includes the idea that participation 
will ‘empower’ citizens. This also supports Nyerere’s concept of self-reliance, 
where participation is an obligation if one is to build a nation (Green 2000, 
2003, 2014). This self-reliance concept has led many villagers, as well as the 
local and central government, to believe that villagers are the ones who are 
responsible for bringing development through volunteer labour or financial 
contributions:
Villagers are the source of development. No one else can bring development 
within the village except villagers themselves. If we need a road, we will build it 
ourselves. If we need a school, we will build it ourselves. The government is not 
capable of bringing development to villagers. The government cannot do each 
and everything. Villagers are responsible to educate themselves and not wait 
for others to come and educate them. If we stay in that situation, we will keep 
complaining that life is harder and that there is no development. Female elder, 
Mvomero
Therefore, we see, that the downwards blame shifting that runs from central 
government is internalised at the village level, and many citizens cast blame 
sideways for a failure to deliver ‘development’.
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Whilst citizens and village leadership are given, and give themselves, 
a central role in delivering development, there is an expectation that local 
government, MPs, and the President will play their part:
The responsibility to reduce poverty lies with our leaders – councillors, MP and 
Ministers – because these individuals know a lot about peoples’ problems. Thus, 
they are required to use all national resources properly and avoid fraud over 
government funds and embezzlement of funds. Interview, male, Mvomero
The one who is responsible to bring development to people is the government 
because all source of revenues are owned by the government. Interview, male, 
Kigoma
NGOs- many actors and many lines of blame
NGO participants in focus groups claimed that politicians do not take action on 
problems facing citizens. Councillors were perceived as not taking peoples’ views 
seriously and not cooperating well with NGOs; they had more interest in getting 
allowances than in developing their wards (constituencies):
There is a need to hold local government (councillors and MPs) to account, 
because they don’t perform their duties properly (poor efficiency); for example, 
our MP has not been to visit us since we elected him even to give greetings. Our 
MP has confused us very much because we see him go to the parliament, but he 
doesn’t come to visit us here; what things does he say in the parliament? 
Participant, focus group, Mvomero
The leaders can be told they are not doing their jobs in the village meetings. 
Some of the village leaders do not attend meeting and even when they attend, 
they don’t take it seriously – they do not ask questions. Participant, focus group, 
Mvomero
Participants said that poor accountability was caused by the absence of 
a platform to bring together representatives, the government and NGOs to 
share knowledge and experience. They suggested blame lies with weak co- 
ordination functions in the District Council.
NGO focus group participants noted that many elected leaders did not 
have access to the necessary information. For example, education coordina-
tors had no information on national education policy and therefore were not 
aware of what it entailed:
Elected local leaders sometimes do not know their responsibilities and this has 
been due to absence of well-structured guidelines and strategies to bring about 
people’s well-being, such as nutrition, health and education. Participant, focus 
group, Kigoma.
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Mapping ‘blameworlds’
In order to make sense of these multiple lines of blame, the research team 
mapped organising the data using Hood’s notion of blameworld as shown in 
Table 2. This allows us to identify narratives of blame and blame avoidance as 
properties of different sets of agents.
Public policymaking in Tanzania is shaped by external pressures from the 
normative agendas of aid agencies, and internal political dynamics. The large 
bilateral and multilateral development agencies operate in a blameworld that 
emphasises reform of institutions, and creation of policies that articulate 
normative development agendas, such as the SDGs. Therefore, official poli-
cies are often designed to address these agendas, rather than the particula-
rities and capabilities of the Tanzanian context and rely on an assumption of 
aid-supported implementation (Green 2000, 2014; Mdee and Harrison 2019).
At the same time, the central state deploys a strong public discourse of blame 
for failures and lack of progress in public service delivery on its own uneducated 
and backwards population. This population is seen to require sensitisation on how 
to become developed. Development (maendeleo) as a hermeneutic concept has 
a significant cultural life of its own in Tanzania (Green 2014), and the state has 
deployed this language since independence to condition political and individual 
behaviour. See, for example Maghimbi (2012) who blames parents for not paying 
more for education, as a reason for poor outcomes in the education system. The 
special narrative history of development/maendeleo thus shapes blame and 
responsibility discourse, and plays a strong cultural role placing responsibility 
on citizens themselves to deliver maendeleo. Maendeleo has become a normative 
mission of the state and is imbued with the presumed attitudes and behaviours of 
modernity, that will deliver advanced infrastructure (roads, hospitals, schools), 
institutions (export markets, bureaucracy) and materially improved livelihoods 
(cars, TVs, adequate food) (Green 2014; Mdee et al. 2019; de Bont, Komakech, and 
Veldwisch 2019).
In the recent authoritarian turn in Tanzanian politics, since the election of 
John Pombe Magufuli, political opposition has been supressed as it is blamed 
for distracting the state from delivering ‘development’. Magufuli is overtly 
using a presentational strategy that visibly targets corruption in public insti-
tutions, through the removal of ‘ghost workers’, public dismissals of leaders 
and rousing speeches to the public.5
The central state has in effect enacted a partial decentralisation: whilst 
many service delivery responsibilities are devolved to the districts, the 
resource flows seldom meet planned allocations (Lange 2008; Mdee and 
Thorley 2016a, 2016b). Problems with the reliability, availability and time-
liness of funds came up repeatedly with district officials, as a reason for the 
lack of improvement in public services, but in an authoritarian and hierarch-
ical culture, it is difficult to be overtly critical of the upper layers of the state 
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bureaucracy. Ran’s (2017) work on the failure of decentralised environmental 
governance in China would make an interesting comparative study here.
The districts have few resources for presentational strategies of blame 
avoidance and predominantly echo the central government playbook: ‘maen-
deleo requires modernisation, we need resources to do this, people must be 
sensitised to play their role in creating development’. Therefore, the elected 
representatives of the people (ward councillors), are also blamed for their 
failure in mobilising the people to contribute properly to ‘development’.
At the village/street level service delivery and citizen representation func-
tions appear blurred. Most officials and representatives are unpaid yet fulfil 
many formal public functions across health, education, social services, justice 
and security, environment and livelihoods. So, should we view them as part of 
the government or as citizens? To all intents and purposes, government in 
Tanzania still operates as a one-party state and therefore citizen leaders are 
expected to deliver the agenda of the central government. Therefore, citizens 
are servants of the central state, exactly counter to the expectations of social 
accountability mechanisms which ask the citizen to hold the state to account.
The self-reliance concept has led many citizens, as well as the local and 
central government, to believe that citizen are the ones who are responsible 
for bringing development through volunteer labour or financial contribu-
tions, and their failure to do so is caused by selfishness, the breakdown of 
society or even the influence of the socialist past where people expect the 
government to do everything for them.
The idea that NGOs will hold the government to account for service 
delivery in this space is problematic. Whilst the literature shows examples 
of NGOs mobilising citizens to demand that public servants deliver on their 
promises (Mdee and Thorley 2016a). Such projects tend to exist as time- 
limited responses to opportunities to access donor funding and have a little 
lasting impact on the public space in Tanzania (Beckmann & Bujra 2010; Mdee 
and Thorley 2016b) and are becoming increasingly difficult in the increasingly 
authoritarian public space in Tanzania. Some NGOs representatives, and 
particularly those who have participated in governance and accountability 
workshops have imbibed the donor-driven social accountability blame nar-
rative: that the citizen needs to hold the government to account, through 
naming and shaming strategies. At the same time, NGOs echo the same top- 
down narrative of blame that points to the ‘uneducated’ and dependent 
citizen for a lack of progress in service delivery.
Organising visual representation of the different ‘blameworlds’ in opera-
tion in this space reveals previously hidden dynamics of blame and allows 
open discussion of them. This analysis was used as the starting point by 
stakeholder working groups in phase 2 for the design of a local governance 
performance index, as it enabled the different actors involved (District offi-
cials, elected representatives, NGO representatives) to discuss the actual 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES 17
complexity of local service delivery problems and performance. This analysis 
was also refined and validated by village-level interviewees during their 
participation in phase 2 design work.
The ethnographic method mapped lines of blame in cooperation with 
stakeholders across the governance system. The aim of doing so was not to 
apportion blame but to identify how blame was used to shift responsibility 
and to obfuscate responsibility. We found that this process created a neutral 
space to discuss blame and failure, and therefore to start to discuss problems 
and blockages in service delivery. This enabled different groups of stake-
holders to step away from their official scripts, in which they couch failure in 
terms of non-compliance with the ideals of official policy, and to address 
what is actually occurring in the local governance space.
Conclusion
That citizens should hold the government to account to deliver their rights to 
services is a powerful idea in the international development industry. Yet 
such ideals are extremely difficult to implement in practice even where it 
appears that citizen-led planning processes are part of formal government 
policy. Our work shows that whilst on paper Tanzania has a citizen-centred 
and bottom-up decentralised development planning process; in practice, the 
system functions in a top-down and hierarchical manner with significant 
blame for lack of progress directed at citizens themselves. It has generated 
a system where energy is focused on blaming other actors for failure/inertia 
and avoiding responsibility for improvement. Building a collective under-
standing between local stakeholders (government, elected representatives 
and civil society) of how blame was being shifted proved a valuable starting 
point for a realistic discussion on how to address improvements in govern-
ance and service delivery. We argue that this is a far more effective starting 
point for social accountability intervention than the fantastical and abstract 
notion of the ‘citizen’ shouting at the system to demand their ‘rights’.
Notes
1. See for example the Oxfam Chakua Hatua Programme in Tanzania https:// 
policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/the-chukua-hatua-accountability- 
programme-tanzania-338436.
2. This project ‘Holding local leaders and local service provision to account: the 
politics of implementing a local governance performance index; (ES/L00545X/1) 
was funded by the UK Department for International Development/Economic 
and Social Research Council Poverty Alleviation Research Programme from 
2014–17.
3. A coalition of researchers led by Anna Mdee and Andrew Mushi of Mzumbe 
University with Imran Sherali of Foundation for Civil Society, Rachel Hayman of 
18 A. MDEE AND A. MUSHI
INTRAC, Andrew Coulson of Birmingham University working with stakeholder 
reference groups (made up of local government office holders and civil society 
representatives) in each District.
4. The MEO fulfils the same functions as the Village Executive Officer, but is 
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